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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 28, 1982, Robert Shelburne, Scott Turner, David Rice,
and Lisa Fuston drove to the Holiday Inn in Fort Pierce, Florida to go
to the Rodeo Bar located inside the hotel.' When the group arrived and
attempted to park in the hotel's lot, they were instructed by a security
1. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
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guard not to park on the lot, as it was reserved for hotel guests.2 In-
stead, the group parked on an adjacent lot owned by Ingram's Fruit
Stand. After several hours in the bar, the group left and walked to-
wards their car. As they were approaching the car, a fight broke out on
Ingram's lot between members of the group and two individuals, Carter
and Bennett. During the fight, Carter shot Turner, Rice, and Shel-
burne, killing Rice.
After the incident, Shelburne, Turner, and Rice's parents sued
Holiday Inns under a negligence theory, and were awarded damages
approaching $5,000,000 for the injuries to Shelburne and Turner, and
for Rice's death.3 On appeal, Holiday Inns argued that as a matter of
law, their duty of care with respect to patrons ended at the physical
boundaries of the hotel's property.4 However, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision, finding
Holiday Inns liable even though the incident did not take place on the
hotel's property.5 This holding represents Florida's recognition of off-
premises liability, because Shelburne was the first case in Florida in
which a landowner was held liable for an injury occurring on adjacent
property not owned by the landowner. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal utilized various factors to support its decision to hold Holiday
Inns liable for the off-premises incident. For instance, the court relied
on the fact that the hotel knew its patrons used adjacent lots for park-
ing, and even suggested that patrons park on neighboring lots." Also,
the court regarded the hotel as having extended its business activities
beyond its legal boundaries by instructing bar patrons to park on adja-
cent property. 7 In addition, the fact that the hotel was economically
benefitting from its rent-free use of the Ingram lot factored into the
court's decision to hold the hotel liable.8 Although the court held Holi-
day Inns liable for the off-premises incident, the court certified a ques-
tion to the Florida Supreme Court as to whether an invitor who has
extended its business activities beyond the premises owned or leased
can be held liable to an invitee who is injured in the extended area.9
2. Id. at 324, 328.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 328.
5. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
6. Id. at 329.
7. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 337. The certified question read, "[w]hen an invitor has extended its
business activities beyond the area actually owned or leased and an invitee is injured in
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In order to answer this question, this article examines the current
state of off-premises liability in Florida, and discusses how other juris-
dictions have approached the off-premises liability issue. Following this
discussion, the article focuses on various factors useful in making an
accurate prediction of the certified question's final determination by the
Florida Supreme Court. The article then discusses the Fourth District's
opinion in Shelburne, and based on the facts of this decision, applies
the five factors to the Shelburne case. The final section is reserved for
determining the future impact of Shelburne on Florida premises
liability.
II. THE HISTORICAL RELUCTANCE OF RECOGNIZING OFF-
PREMISES LIABILITY
An invitor's duty of care with respect to invitees extends only as
far as the scope of the invitor's invitation. 10 Traditionally, most courts
have held that the scope of an invitation ends at the physical boundary
lines of the invitor's property.1" One reason why these courts have used
boundary lines to govern the scope of liability was that if an injury
occurred outside of a landowner's premises, the landowner could not
have had the requisite control over the dangerous situation to prevent
the injury."
Currently, other jurisdictions such as Louisiana refuse to hold a
landowner liable for an off-premises injury unless the landowner cre-
ated the hazardous condition which caused the injury."3 Still other
courts refuse to recognize off-premises liability due to policy considera-
tions concerning the difficulty in drawing the line as to where such lia-
that extended area, can the invitor be liable under a negligence theory?" Id.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. I (1965).
11. Delvaux v. Langenberg, 387 N.W.2d 751, 762 (Wis. 1986); see also Cothern
v. LaRocca, 232 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. 1970) ("[O]wner owes only to invitees upon his
premises the reasonable care providing a safe place for them upon that property.")
(emphasis added).
12. Rodriguez v. Detroit Sportsmen's Congress, 406 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987); see also Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909,
914 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. George v. Western Auto Supply Co., 527 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (store owner not liable for a slippery sidewalk because he did not create the
hazard); see Udy v. Calvary Corp., 780 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App, 1989) (land-
owner held liable for the death of a boy hit by a truck after running into the street,
because the accident was caused by the landowner's failure to erect a fence around his
property).
1991]
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bility should end."
Prior to Shelburne, the only Florida case dealing with an incident
which occurred off the invitor's premises was Chateloin v. Flanigan's
Enterprises."8 In Chateloin, a patron of a bar was shot by another pa-
tron."' However, the shooting took place several miles from the bar and
"a considerable time" after the patrons had left the bar." The Third
District Court of Appeal refused to hold the bar owner liable, because
the shooting was "too remote as to time and place."'"
Although the facts in Chateloin did not warrant the imposition of
off-premises liability on the bar owner, Chateloin conceivably set the
stage for Florida's recognition of off-premises liability in Shelburne.
The majority in Shelburne distinguished Chateloin , because the shoot-
ing on Ingram's lot took place next door to the hotel and "only minutes
after the individuals crossed the property line,"' 9 as opposed to the
"considerable" period of time which had elapsed in Chateloin. Thus, by
distinguishing Chateloin, the Shelburne court was implicitly saying
that although the facts in Chateloin did not warrant the imposition of
off-premises liability, the facts in the instant case do give rise to off-
premises liability.
Although most jurisdictions today do not adhere to a general rule
holding landowners liable for off-premises incidents, 0 the current trend
14. E.g., Rodriguez, 406 N.W.2d at 210; see Mostert v. C.B.L. & Assoc., 741
P.2d 1090, 1099 (Wyo. 1987) (movie theater was not liable for failing to warn patrons
about flash flooding of streets surrounding the theater property). The policy considera-
tion behind the court's decision in Mostert was the concern that extending liability
would stretch the landowner's duty too far, because it would be difficult to place a
limitation on off-premises liability. 741 P.2d at 1099.
15. 423 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1002. Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on the accident as to
the invitee's distance from the premises, or how long after the invitee left the premises
did the incident occur, If these facts were given, it would have been easier to formulate
a standard for off-premises liability as to time and distance constraints. For example, if
the injury occurred several miles from the invitor's premises, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the invitor should not be held liable for such a distant injury. Similarly,
if the incident occurred hours after the invitee left the bar, then it would have been
difficult for the injured party to prove the proximate causation element needed to re-
cover under negligence.
19. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (construing Chateloin v Flanigan's Enters., 423 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)).
20. E.g., Delvaux v. Langenberg, 387 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Wis. 1986) (tavern
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is that courts will hold a landowner liable for off-premises injuries
when certain factors are present. These factors are: whether an invitee
still had invitee status at the time of the injury;21 whether the land-
owner had control over the adjacent premises where the injury oc-
curred;2 2 whether the activities of the landowner were the legal cause
of the injury on the adjacent property;28 whether the landowner benefit-
ted economically from the adjacent property; 4 and whether the injury
was foreseeable, regardless of where the injury occurred.2 5 These five
factors have been used singularly and in various combinations by courts
in finding landowners liable for off-premises injuries, and are the com-
mon denominator as to when such liability will apply.26
III. SHELBURNE AND THE FIVE FACTORS
A. Status as an Invitee
Premises liability in Florida, as well as most other jurisdictions,
has traditionally been dependent upon the entrant's status as an invi-
tee.2 A business invitee is defined as anyone who enters the land for a
purpose connected with the business;2 8 a possessor of land owes a duty
owner owes no duty to invitees beyond his business premises).
21. Maynard v. Walker, 345 P.2d 478, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
22. Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, 757 F.2d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1985)
("[Wihoever controls the land is responsible for its safety."); Gordon v. Schultz Savo
Stores, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Wis. 1972) (same); Rodriguez, 406 N.W.2d at 210
(same).
23. Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); George v. Western Auto Supply Co., 527 So. 2d 428, 430 (La.
Ct. App. 1988).
24. Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
25. Piedalue v. Clinton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 32, 692 P.2d 20, 23 (Mont.
1984); see Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1983).
26. See, e.g., Ember, 490 N.E.2d at 772-73 (the court used the invitee status
factor in addition to the economic benefit and foreseeability factors); Udy v. Calvary
Corp., 780 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (court used both the causation
and foresceability factors).
27. Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Petterson, 216 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 1968) (status
as either invitee or trespasser determines whether the party will be able to recover for
negligence); W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
62 (1984). This article focuses on invitor/invitee law, thus the classifications of licensee
and trespasser will not be discussed.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
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to exercise reasonable care for the safety of business invitees.2 9 Using
this definition, it is clear that the Shelburne group consisted of business
invitees while they were in the bar, since they entered the hotel's prop-
erty to patronize the bar. But did they lose their status as invitees when
they were walking back to their car by crossing the boundary line be-
tween the hotel's parking lot and Ingram's Fruit Stand?
The general rule is that an invitor's duty of care normally extends
only to the boundaries of its premises.8 ° Hence, under this rule, the
Shelburne individuals would cease to be invitees once they crossed onto
Ingram's lot. However, courts have recognized that there are certain
situations in which a person retains invitee status even when that per-
son leaves the premises owned by the invitor 3 1 One situation where a
person retains his invitee status is when the landowner knows his invi-
tees regularly use an adjacent lot for parking. 2
For example, the Indiana case of Ember v. B.F.D., Inc.33 is similar
to Shelburne in that a tavern owner failed to provide sufficient parking
for his patrons, and knew that patrons customarily used an adjacent lot
for parking. 4 The Ember court held that because the tavern owner
knew its patrons used the adjacent lot, the owner had impliedly ex-
tended his business activities beyond the premises owned.3" As a result,
the tavern was held liable to a patron assaulted on the adjacent lot,
because the court determined that the patron was still an invitee.36
Similarly, in Shelburne, the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn had a prac-
tice of requesting bar patrons to park off the premises in order to pre-
serve the limited number of parking spaces for hotel guests. 37 The hotel
had extended its business activities to include the use of Ingram's prop-
erty. Under this theory, the Shelburne individuals continued to be invi-
tees of the hotel when the incident on Ingram's lot occurred. Therefore,
the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn owed a duty of reasonable care to these
people.
29. Casby v. Flint, 520 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 1988) (There is a "duty of reasona-
ble care owed to the invitee."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. 1 (1965).
30. E.g., Ember, 490 N.E.2d at 772.
31. E.g., id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 764.
34. Id.
35. Ember, 490 N.E.2d at 764.
36. Id.
37. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
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In addition to the extension of business activities theory, Florida
courts have also extended the scope of invitee status to include means
of ingress to and egress from the invitor's property.38 This would in-
clude approaches to the property which the invitee would be reasonably
expected to use to get to the invitor's place of business.3 9 Similarly,
other jurisdictions have held that a patron does not lose his status as an
invitee by using a means of ingress or egress which the invitor has told
him to use, or which he has been led to believe is the appropriate
means of reaching the invitor's property.4
Applying this logic, because the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn had a
practice of instructing bar patrons to park on adjacent lots, such as
Ingram's, the Shelburne individuals remained invitees for the purpose
of using Ingram's lot as a means of ingress to and egress from the
Rodeo Bar. Thus, Holiday Inn's duty of care to Shelburne and the rest
of his group did not end when they stepped off the hotel's property.
B. Control
Control is a prerequisite to liability of the landowner, regardless of
where the injury occurred."' Generally, an occupier of land is deemed
to have control only over the area which he possesses. 2 However, when
a landowner treats his neighbor's property as an integral part of his
own, he is conceivably exercising control over the adjoining land."3 This
38. Shields v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 106 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1958), cert. denied, 109 So. 2d 168 (1959).
39. Id. In Shields, a supermarket was held liable for the appellant's injuries sus-
tained when he fell off his motorcycle at an entrance to the store's parking lot. Id. at
90. The accident was caused by potholes in the entrance. Id. Even though the super-
market did not legally own the entrance to its store, the court held that the store should
have maintained the entrances to its parking lot, because patrons must use the en-
trances as a means of approach. Id. at 92.
40. See, e.g., Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, 170 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1946)
(restaurant owner held liable for an injury on an adjacent walkway leading up to the
restaurant because the owner knew that many patrons used the walkway to approach
the restaurant). The California Supreme Court determined that the injured patron was
entitled to the protection of an invitee because she was led to believe that the walkway
was an appropriate means of reaching the restaurant. Id.
41. Rodriguez v. Detroit Sportsmen's Congress, 406 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987).
42. E.g., id.
43. Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir.
1985).
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control may allow an invitee to recover from a landowner for an injury
occurring on adjacent property."
In Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties,5 control over the adjoin-
ing land formed the basis of off-premises liability. A restaurant owner,
in Johnston, had made arrangements with the service station next door
to allow restaurant patrons to park on the gas station's lot." However,
after this arrangement had been terminated restaurant patrons contin-
ued to use the gas station's lot for parking. When a restaurant patron
sued for an injury sustained on the adjacent lot, the California Su-
preme Court found the restaurant liable for the patron's injury, be-
cause the restaurant owner knew his patrons were still using the adja-
cent lot."" Thus, the restaurant was exercising control over the gas
station's lot and was responsible for the injury occurring on that lot.4 8
On the other hand, adjacent lots may be used by the public in
general and not exclusively by patrons of an invitor. This situation acts
as a shield to protect the invitor from liability for patrons injured on
the adjacent lot, since the invitor is not considered to have the requisite
control over an adjacent public lot.4 9 For example, in Gordon v. Sch-
ultz Savo Stores, Inc.,5" a grocery store was held not liable to a patron
for an injury which occurred in the parking lot in front of the store. 1
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that the parking lot was used
by the public in general.6 2 Therefore, because the grocer had little di-
rect contact with the lot, he did not have the level of control over the
public lot needed to hold him responsible for the injury.53 Similarly, in
La Fleur v. Astrodome-Astrohall Stadium Corp.5 4 the owners of the
Houston Astrodome were not liable for an assault on a patron which
44. Id.
45. 170 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1946).
46. Id. at 7.
47. Id.
48. Id. Even though the parking arrangement made between the restaurant and
service station had ended, the restaurant continued to control the use of the service
station's lot in the evenings when the station was closed. Id.
49. See, e.g., Gordon v. Shultz Savo Stores, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Wis.
1972); La Fleur v. Astrodome-Astrohall Stadium Corp., 751 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988).
50. 196 N.W.2d 633 (Wis. 1972).
51. Id. at 636.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 751 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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occurred on an adjacent public street corner. In both of these cases,
the corporations had no control over the public property adjacent to
their own property where the injuries occurred. As a result, neither
company was held liable for the off-premises injury.
However, in Shelburne, patrons of the Rodeo Bar were the exclu-
sive users of Ingram's lot when the incident occurred, since the fruit
stand was closed for vacation.56 On this basis, the "public lot" defense
would not work in Shelburne, as applied in Gordon and La Fleur. Also,
Holiday Inns was using Ingram's property as an integral part of its
own, because the hotel regularly "suggested" to bar patrons that they
use adjacent lots, including Ingram's lot, for parking.5 7 Thus, the Fort
Pierce Holiday Inn was exercising dominion and control over the In-
gram lot by treating the lot as if it belonged to the hotel. Under the
control factor, the plaintiffs' recovery against Holiday Inns was justi-
fied, regardless of the fact that the shooting occurred outside the hotel's
boundaries.
C. Causation
Traditionally, courts are more inclined to attach off- premises lia-
bility when the injury was caused by a negligent landowner.5 8 For ex-
ample, in Udy v. Calvary Corp.,59 a child was hit by a truck when he
ran out into a street. 60 The Arizona Appellate Court determined that
the accident was caused by the apartment complex's failure to provide
a fence around its property.61 As a result, the apartment complex
owner was held liable for the off-premises injury because the injury was
caused by an act of negligence on the part of the apartment complex in
failing to provide a fence.62
An owner was also held liable in the Florida case of Holley v. Mt.
55. Id. at 566.
56. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
57. Id. at 329.
58. Udy v. Calvary Corp., 780 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); see Hol-
ley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 782 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (landlord liable because inadequate security caused the murder of a tenant in-
side a unit).
59. 780 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
60. Id. at 1058.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1062.
1991]
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Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc.,63 when a woman was raped and mur-
dered inside her apartment."' Normally, a landlord does not owe a ten-
ant any duty of care inside an apartment unit because the landlord
lacks the requisite control over the unit. 65 The Third District Court of
Appeal, however, determined that the incident inside the apartment
unit was caused by the landlord's failure to provide adequate security
for the common areas over which the landlord had control.66 As a re-
sult, the apartment complex was held liable, even though the incident
technically occurred off its premises because the attack took place in-
side a unit. 7
In Shelburne, the legal cause of the harm stemmed from the fact
that the security guard "suggested" to bar patrons that they park next
door.68 This created a duty on the part of the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn
to provide additional security to patrol neighboring lots used by the
hotel's patrons. Thus, Holiday Inns' failure to hire an additional secur-
ity guard was the legal cause of the shooting, since the shooting may
not have occurred if an extra security guard was there to break up the
fight. The Fourth District Court in Shelburne noted that the jury con-
sidered the issue of whether inadequate security was the legal cause of
the shooting, 9 thus making it evident that the causation factor played
a role in Shelburne as well.
D. Economic Benefit
The "economic benefit" factor receives a great deal of attention,
and is heavily weighed in opinions holding a landowner liable for off-
premises injuries.7 Courts often utilize this factor in making a policy
argument in favor of extending liability to include adjacent property. 1
63. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
64. Id. at 99.
65. E.g., id. at 101.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 102.
68. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
69. Id. ("The jury in the instant case also properly determined the issue of
whether the appellants' alleged breach of duty on its premises was a legal cause of the
shooting off its premises.").
70. See, e.g., Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986);
Davis v. Pecorino, 350 A.2d 51, 55 (N.J. 1975). This is evidenced by the fact that the
economic benefit factor is discussed in depth by courts utilizing this factor in holding
landowners liable for off-premises injuries.
71. Ember, 490 N.E.2d at 773; see Davis, 350 A.2d at 54 (One gaining "coin-
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Such an argument was used in the Indiana case of Ember v. B.F.D.,
Inc. 7
In Ember, a bar patron was assaulted in an adjacent parking lot
used regularly by bar patrons."' The court, in holding the tavern liable
for the off-premises injury, concluded that if a business invitor was not
held liable for off-premises injuries which occur on adjacent property
providing economic benefit to the invitor, then "a business invitor could
invade the public streets for its economic benefit while simultaneously
absolving itself from liability otherwise imposed just a few feet away
under identical circumstances."' 7' Likewise, if a business invitor is de-
riving a commercial benefit from its special use of adjacent property,
then the invitor is deemed to be in the best position to prevent injury to
patrons who venture onto the adjacent land."'
On the other hand, other courts argue that the derivation of an
economic benefit alone should not be enough to impose liability on an
invitor.7" For example, the Illinois Appellate Court in Brunsfeld v.
Mineola Hotel and Restaurant, Inc. reasoned:
If we were to hold that places of business which benefit economi-
cally from the existence of a publicly-owned recreational facility in
close proximity to their premises are liable for the off-premises ac-
tions of their customers ... then, to protect themselves, they
would be forced to ...place appropriate warning signs, and to
monitor and control the actions of all who used those public facili-
ties. We do not believe that the law does or should impose such a
mercial benefit" from his use of adjacent land "is in the best position to be aware of
and guard against any dangerous condition caused by this use.").
72. 490 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
73. Id. at 766.
74. Id. at 773. The term "economic benefit" or its equivalent is used by most
courts in off-premises liability cases to refer to a situation where a landowner is using
his neighbor's property for his own gain, without having to pay rent. See, e.g., Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (the hotel
was using the adjacent property "rent free for their own business purposes"); cf. Brun-
sfeld v. Mineola Hotel & Restaurant, Inc., 456 N.E.2d 361, 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(race track did not benefit economically from an adjacent lake).
75. Davis, 350 A.2d at 54-55. In Davis, a woman was injured when she fell on a
snow-covered public sidewalk in front of a service station. Id. at 52. The court deter-
mined that even though the sidewalk was public, the service station's owner was liable
because the hazard was caused by his special use of the sidewalk as cars drove in and
out of the station, which packed the snow on the sidewalk. Id. at 53, 55.
76. See, e.g., Brunsfeld, 456 N.E.2d at 366.
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heavy burden upon such places of business."
However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Shelburne did
not accept this reasoning. The court found that the Fort Pierce Holiday
Inn was directly benefiting from its use of the Ingram lot because the
hotel was using the lot "rent free for their own business purposes. '197
Accordingly, the court utilized the economic benefit factor in holding
Holiday Inns liable for the injury on the neighboring lot.7 9
E. Foreseeability
Foreseeability is the key factor in determining whether an invitor
should be liable for an off-premises injury. 80 Rather than limiting lia-
bility to strictly on-premises injuries, courts are now beginning to use
foreseeability as the standard for finding an owner liable for injuries
occurring off the owner's premises.
Courts utilize the foreseeability factor in a variety of ways. One
common variation of foreseeability used in cases dealing with actions of
third parties is the "prior similar acts" rule.82 Under the prior similar
acts rule, an attack on a patron by a third party is only considered
foreseeable if the premises has a history of prior similar acts.88
This rule has been adopted by Florida courts, as they often look to
whether the premises had a history of problems similar to whatever
77. Id. Brunsfeld involved a snowmobile operator who was injured while operat-
ing his snowmobile on a frozen lake adjacent to the Mineola Hotel & Restaurant. Id.
at 363.
78. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
79. Id.
80. See Piedalue v. Clinton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 32, 692 P.2d 20, 23
(Mont. 1984); Udy v. Calvary, 780 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). As with
the economic benefit factor, the foreseeability factor's utility to courts is evidenced by
the fact that foreseeability receives more attention than any other factor in opinions
holding landowners liable for off-premises injuries.
81. See, e.g., Mostert v. C.B.L. & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Wyo. 1987);
Piedalue, 692 P.2d at 23 (unnecessary that owner control the adjacent property if the
hazard "created a foreseeable risk of harm to business invitees .... "); Udy, 780 P.2d
at 1059 ("foreseeability of harm" is the governing standard once a duty is established);
Bach v. State, 730 P.2d 854, 857 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
82. Gregory A. Eiesland, Attacks in Parking Lots: Driving Home Liability of
Owners, 23 TRIAL 108, 108 (Sept. 1990).
83. Id.
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activity caused the injury at hand.8 However, to date, Florida has only
used the prior similar acts rule in determining whether a landowner is
liable for an on-premises injury.8 5 For example, in Stevens v. Jefferson,
which involved an on-premises shooting at a bar, the Florida Supreme
Court held for the plaintiff because the plaintiff proved the shooting
was foreseeable by demonstrating that the bar "was a rough place with
a history of fights and gunplay . "..."86
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Shelburne was the first
Florida court to use the prior similar acts rule to find a landowner lia-
ble for an off-premises injury. In fact, the court went even further by
allowing evidence of prior dissimilar acts as well.88 The court argued
that it would be against Florida's public policy to limit evidence of
foreseeability to only prior similar acts.89 In fact, the Fourth District
Court allowed as evidence fifty-eight similar and dissimilar criminal
acts committed at the Rodeo Bar prior to the shooting.90
Another variation of the foreseeability factor used extensively in
jurisdictions throughout the country in off-premises liability cases is
whether the invitor knew its invitees were using the adjacent property
at the time of the off-premises injury.91 As previously discussed, an in-
vitor's knowledge of patron use of an adjacent property may extend a
patron's status as an invitee to include the use of neighboring prop-
erty.92 But in addition, an invitor's knowledge is important in determin-
ing whether the off-premises injury was foreseeable. For example, in
Margrabe v. Graves,9 3 the First District Court of Appeal reasoned that
a business invitor cannot be held liable for an injury on an adjacent lot
where the invitor had no reason to believe that his patrons would use
84. Allen v. Babrab, Inc., 438 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. 1983); Stevens v. Jefferson,
436 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1983).
85. Stevens, 436 So. 2d at 35.
86. Id.
87. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 325.
88. Id. at 331.
89. Id. A rule limiting evidence to only prior similar acts would be against public
policy because such a rule would "contravene the policy of preventing future harm
... .Surely, a landowner should not get one free assault before he can be held liable
for criminal acts which occur on his property." Id.
90. Id.
91. Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); see
Cothern v. LaRocca, 232 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. 1970); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 442 (1968).
92. Ember, 490 N.E. 2d at 772.
93. 97 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
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the adjacent lot for parking.9 '
However, in Shelburne, even though it was disputed at trial as to
whether the security guard told Shelburne's group to park on Ingram's
lot, it cannot be disputed that the Fort Pierce Holiday Inn had knowl-
edge that the Ingram lot was being used by its bar patrons, since the
hotel required bar patrons to park on the lots adjacent to the hotel.9" In
fact the Shelburne court noted this on several occasions in its opinion,96
and this knowledge gave rise to liability on the part of Holiday Inns.
In addition, the Shelburne court could also have addressed the is-
sue of foreseeability of patrons using adjacent lots by utilizing the rule
of implied invitation. 7 Under this reasoning, if an invitor impliedly ex-
tends an invitation to its invitees to use an adjacent premises, then the
invitor is deemed to have knowledge of use of the adjacent premises by
its invitees. 98 For example, in Shelburne, even if the hotel did not ex-
pressly invite bar patrons to park on Ingram's lot, the Fort Pierce Holi-
day Inn impliedly extended to bar patrons an invitation to park on the
Ingram lot, because the hotel required bar patrons to park off the
premises. 99 However, by telling patrons to park off hotel property, the
Fort Pierce Holiday Inn was implying that patrons should park on any
of the lots adjacent to the hotel, including the Ingram lot. Thus, under
the implied invitation rule, Holiday Inns would be deemed to have the
knowledge of its patrons' use of the Ingram lot since it was foreseeable
that patrons might park on Ingram's lot. In sum, whichever approach
to foreseeability is used, the shooting on the Ingram lot was properly
labeled by the court as foreseeable.
F. Reconciliation of the Five Factors
In allowing the cause of action giving rise to off-premises liability,
the Fourth District Court in Shelburne utilized the five factors previ-
ously discussed. The Florida Supreme Court should use these factors in
94. Id. at 499. The landowner did not know the invitees were using the adjacent
property. Therefore he was not liable for an injury to an invitee when she fell in a
sunken driveway on the neighboring lot, since this injury was unforeseeable. Id.
95. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328-29.
96. Id. ("[T]he evidence in the present case shows that appellants knew their
patrons customarily used adjacent premises for parking in order to patronize the Rodeo
Bar.").
97. See Cothern v. La Rocca, 232 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. 1970).
98. Id.
99. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
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deciding which way to answer the certified question, and should do an
analysis similar to the above analysis of these five factors. After looking
at these factors, the Florida Supreme Court could only answer the cer-
tified question in the affirmative. This makes perfect sense, because the
Florida Supreme Court should extend premises liability to include off-
premises injuries when an invitor has extended its activities beyond the
boundaries of its property.
IV. SHELBURNE'S IMPACT ON FLORIDA BUSINESSES AND THE
LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY
A. Will Florida Be Able to Place a Practical Limitation on
Off-Premises Liability After Shelburne?
Jurisdictions refusing to recognize off-premises liability have often
reasoned that it would be difficult to determine which off-premises inju-
ries a landowner should be liable for.100 Most assuredly, using a physi-
cal boundary line as a limitation on liability is a simplified, bright line
approach to determining liability. This is why certain jurisdictions still
recognize the property line as the extent of premises liability.101 It is
judicially convenient to do so because it provides courts with a simple
ascertainable standard. However, as an ever increasing number of
courts begin to recognize off-premises liability, a new standard must
emerge to limit the extent of off-premises liability. Fortunately, there
are several workable options available.102
For example, as previously noted, foreseeability has been used ef-
fectively by courts as a limitation on off-premises liability in cases rec-
ognizing liability for off-premises injuries.103 In using foreseeability as
the limiting factor, the scope of the duty of care is determined by
whether the off-premises injury was foreseeable, rather than having the
scope of duty governed by the landowner's property line.10 4 This is a
more fair and reasonable limitation on liability than boundary lines,
100. See, e.g., Mostert v. C.B.L. & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1099 (Wyo. 1987)
(refused to recognize off-premises liability because it would be difficult to place a prac-
tical limitation on such liability).
101. See, e.g., Delvaux v. Langenberg, 387 N.W.2d 751, 761 (Wis. 1986); Rod-
riguez v. Detroit Sportsmen's Congress, 406 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
102. For a discussion of possible factors which could be used to limit off-premises
liability, see supra section II of the text.
103. E.g., Udy, 780 P.2d at 1059.
104. Id.; see also Bach v. State, 730 P.2d 854, 857 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
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because if an injury was foreseeable, the injured party should be able
to recover from a negligent landowner regardless of where the injury
occurred, since the landowner breached a duty owed to the invitee.
105
Causation is another factor that could be used as a new limitation
on liability instead of boundary lines. The Third District Court of Ap-
peal in Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments'°6 hinted at the possi-
bility of using causation as the limitation on liability instead of focus-
ing on where the injury occurred. In Holley, an apartment owner was
held liable for a murder in an apartment unit, because the incident was
legally caused by the landlord's failure to provide adequate security to
patrol the common areas.1°0 Causation in this sense is a more reasona-
ble limitation on liability than physical boundary lines, since a land-
owner who legally causes an injury to someone should not escape liabil-
ity simply because the injury did not occur on the landowner's
property. 10 8 Those who cause injuries should be liable for such injuries
regardless of the ownership rights in the underlying property where the
injury occurred.
B. Will Shelburne Overwhelm Florida Courts With Off- Prem-
ises Liability Actions?
In decisions that chart new areas of the law, courts are often con-
cerned with whether such decisions will impose extra obligations on the
already overburdened judicial system. 09 This is particularly true with
the issue of off-premises liability. 10 The concern in recognizing off-
premises liability is that it would open up the "floodgates" to substan-
tial numbers of cases involving patrons who suffered off-premises
injuries."
105. Udy v. Calvary Corp., 780 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), provides one of
the best examples of why boundary lines are an inequitable standard. In Udy, a child
was killed when he ran into the street and was hit by a truck. Id. at 1058. In a jurisdic-
tion which recognized boundary lines as the extent of liability, the landowner would not
be liable, even though the accident was entirely caused by his negligent failure to erect
a fence around his property.
106. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
107. Id. at 101.
108. For an illustration of the inequities of using the boundary lines standard,
see supra note 108.
109. See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986); see also Mostert
v. C.B.L. & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1104 (Wyo. 1987).
110. Gates, 719 P.2d at 197.
111. See Mostert, 741 P.2d at 1100 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
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Shelburne does not necessarily mean that courts will be swamped
with off..premises accident claims. The issue of whether Shelburne will
overburden our court system depends entirely on whether, Florida
courts choose a workable standard to use as a practical limitation on
off-premises liability. As mentioned before, several options exist which
could be used effectively to limit off-premises liability. 12 Florida courts
will simply have to set forth which standard will be applied to off-
premises cases as a limitation on off-premises liability. 13 The most effi-
cient way to set up a standard in off-premises liability cases is simply
for the Florida Supreme Court to determine the standard when it an-
swers the certified question. The Florida Supreme Court could prevent
a wave of inconsistent holdings from Florida's lower courts involving
cases where invitees suffered off-premises injuries.
Furthermore, foreseeability is the most effective standard the Flor-
ida Supreme Court could choose as the governing standard in off-prem-
ises liability cases, because foreseeability provides courts and landown-
ers with a simple ascertainable limitation on liability. A landowner can
easily determine his duty of care with respect to adjacent land by ask-
ing himself whether it is foreseeable that one of his invitees might come
into contact with a hazard on adjacent land which the landowner him-
self created."" In addition, foreseeability could be applied when decid-
ing cases involving an injury that occurred several miles from an in-
ing in part). Expressing concern about the majority's recognition of off-premises liabil-
ity, Justice Thomas argued that a business proprietor will now have to warn invitees of
every risk that they might encounter: even danger that is "remote from the place of
business and over which the proprietor has no control." Id; see also Richard E. Wolver-
ton, Current Trends in Bar-Lounge Liability, 7 TRIAL AD Q. 17 (1988); David G.
Ditto, Comment, Wyoming Extends the Duty of Owners and Occupiers to Warn Invi-
tees of Dangers Beyond the Premises, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 641 (1988).
The "floodgates" argument is that if a jurisdiction adopts off-premises liability,
courts in that jurisdiction would become swamped with all sorts of off-premises cases,
including cases where a person was injured perhaps many miles from a landowner's
property, or several hours after the injured person left the landowner's premises.
112. For a discussion of these options, see supra section III (A) of the text.
113. Although the Shelburne court utilized several factors such as foreseeability,
economic benefit, and extension of business activity in its decision to recognize off-
premises liability, the court never set forth a standard to be used as a limitation to off-
premises liability. This is why the task of choosing such a standard will be the responsi-
bility of future Florida courts.
114. Arguably, the creation of the hazardous condition gives rise to its foresee-
ability. If the landowner created the condition, then notice of such a condition should
be imputed on that owner. Thus, the landowner has a duty to warn invitees of the
hazardous condition.
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vitor's premises, or perhaps several hours after an invitee wandered off
an invitor's premises. The likely result would be that injuries occurring
several miles from an invitor's premises, or several hours later, are
probably unforeseeable and no liability would exist for such injuries.
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court should choose foreseeability as
the standard to be used in off-premises liability cases by expressly set-
ting forth this intention when it answers the certified question. By fol-
lowing this course, Shelburne would not represent an overburdening of
the court system.
C. Shelburne's Effect on Property Insurance of Florida
Businesses
Perhaps the biggest concern of Florida businesses in light of Shel-
burne is that their premises liability insurance rates will soar since they
now have to obtain extended coverage to insure the risk of being held
liable for an off-premises injury to a patron. But in reality, it is unlikely
that businesses will really feel the impact of higher insurance rates.
Shelburne's impact on insurance rates will ultimately be borne by con-
sumers, because economists tell us that the most efficient way for com-
panies to manage increased costs is to pass those additional costs on to
consumers in the form of higher prices. n
Of course, courts are not blind to this elementary rule of econom-
ics.' 16 In Mostert v. C.B.L. & Associates,'1 7 Justice Cardine was par-
ticularly concerned about the impact of the majority's decision to hold
a movie theater liable for an off-premises injury and concluded that:
When the theater must pay expensive insurance premiums to cover
these [off-premises] claims, the money must come from somewhere.
The only place it can come from is theater tickets . . . . It is not
unreasonable to believe that the price of theater tickets might
double or triple if theater owners might be held liable for [off-
115. Perhaps the best example of how increased costs of insurance are passed on
to consumers is in the area of medical care, as the extraordinary costs of medical care
in this country are a direct reflection on the costs of medical malpractice insurance. See
Bruce C.N. Greenwald, Medical Malpractice and Medical Costs in THE ECONOMICS
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978).
116. See Mostert, 741 P.2d at 1104-05 (Cardine, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986).
117. 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987).
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premises] accidents . . .,.
In the case of hotels and taverns, the extra revenue needed to
cover the increased costs of property insurance of a place like the Fort
Pierce Holiday Inn or the Rodeo Bar would
probably come in the form of higher room rates or more expensive
drinks. The most effective way businesses can keep their insurance
costs from significantly increasing in light of Shelburne is for busi-
nesses to examine their property closely and re-evaluate their duty of
care. Businesses should ask themselves whether it is foreseeable that
patrons will use adjacent property. If the answer is "yes," then that
business should make every effort to satisfy its duty of care with re-
spect to adjacent land, because in light of Shelburne, liability no longer
ends at the property line.
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court should answer the certified question
in the affirmative, which means that Shelburne should become the pre-
cedent case in Florida holding an invitor liable for an off-premises in-
jury as a result of an invitor's extension of its activities to adjacent
land. Florida's recognition of off-premises liability in this type of situa-
tion is a judicial step in the right direction. Shelburne fills a needed
gap in the area of premises liability, because people like Turner, Rice,
and Shelburne deserve compensation under these circumstances.
Bruce G. Warner
118. Id. at 1105 (Cardine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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